In truth, the seeming ubiquity of religious language in our public debates can itself be a form of trivialization -both because our politicians are expected to repeat largely meaningless religious incantations and because of the modem tendency among committed advocates across the political spectrum to treat Holy Scripture like a dictionary of familiar quotations, combing through the pages to find the ammunition needed to win political arguments. [p. 45] One does not know, of course, whether Carter would apply these same strictures to Clinton and Gore. If so, his critique is powerful indeed -and President Clinton might wish to have his recent Yale Law School portrait retouched; 12 if not, this raises the obvious question as to how one distinguishes the trivial from the authentic -or at least nontrivial -invocation of religious themes beyond one's liking for the politicians in question and for the policies they espouse.
Carter can probably save much of his thesis if he simply restricts it to the particular culture of the academy rather than offering it as a depiction of American culture at large, assuming there is any such thing. It is hard to gainsay the general secularism of the academyparticularly the elite legal academy within which Carter has chosen to spend his own life. It is relatively rare to find even a thoroughly mainstream Episcopalian academic like Carter, let alone an "out" evangelical Christian who is more sympathetic to the claims of "creation science" than to those of Darwinian evolutionism. 13 Carter's thesis and overall approach are in several important respects similar to Michael Perry's, especially as developed in Perry's recent Love and Power. 14 First, both criticize those liberals -including Carter's Yale colleague Bruce Ackerman -who would limit participation in public debate to those willing to obey "a set of conversational rules that require the individual whose religious tradition makes demands on his or her moral conscience to reformulate that conscience -to destroy a vital aspect of the self" (p. 229). This self-destruction results from expressing any public claim in a secularized language that, by definition, omits reference to any religious foundation for that claim. Carter notes Perry's own insistence that acceptance of any such exclusion of explicitly religious convictions and the language in which they are expressed "would be to bracket -12. See supra note 3. 13. Carter offers an extensive discussion of the creation science controversy (pp. 156-82), and he leaves the reader with no doubt that he rejects creationist accounts even as he expresses some sympathy for the parents who support their teaching. But, then, so did Martha Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986 Term -Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REv. 10, 92-93 (1987) . One obviously need not be overtly religious in order to come to this conclusion.
14. MICHAEL J. PERRY, LoVE AND POWER: THE ROLE OF RELIGION AND MORALITY IN AMERICAN PoLmCS (1991) . [Vol. 92:1873 indeed, to annihilate -" essential aspects of one's very self. 15 Instead of offensively requiring any such bracketing, liberals, according to Carter, must "develop a politics that accepts whatever form of dialogue a member of the public offers. Epistemic diversity, like diversity of other kinds, should be cherished, not ignored, and certainly not abolished" (p. 230). Indeed, he points out, correctly, I believe, that liberals who are wont to praise multiculturalism and diversity in most contexts are often hesitant to extend the same welcome to those who speak, and act in accordance with, the language of traditional religion. 16 It is worth noting, though, that Carter, like Perry, in fact seems most comfortable when writing in the standard voice of the liberal academic, even as he calls for greater toleration of epistemic diversity. Indeed, one of the striking aspects of Carter's book is that not one of its substantive arguments, at least in regard to the issues of conventional politics, is made in what might be termed a specifically religious voice. As Emily Fowler Hartigan well points out, Carter's book is about the importance of religious language rather than written in any such language. 17 There is almost no resonance in The Culture of Disbelief of the "confessional" 18 voice found in the writing of fellow Christians like Milner Ball, 19 Thomas Shaffer, 20 or Hartigan herself. 21 Carter does refer to his own religiosity and comment on the importance of school prayer for his children, 22 and at one point he suggests that he had engaged in "prayerful consideration" of the "will of God" in regard to the controversy over the ordination of women within the Episcopal Church. 23 23. Carter refers quite often to the controversy within the Episcopal community regarding the ordination of women. See, e.g .• pp. 75-80. He vigorously asserts that "the correct answer to the question of ordination of women must be found in prayerful consideration. The answer has everything to do with discerning and then enacting the will of God, and nothing to do with the rights of women." P. 77.
Laycock. Carter, says Hartigan, "asks for the public to embrace the previously personalized religious sphere, but does not [himself] demonstrate what he advocates space for." 24 Whatever Carter's defense of religious devotion, he does not "give ... witness. to its role in his own life," 25 at least insofar as his discussion of public policy is concerned.
The closest he comes to anything that might be labeled "witness" is in a dramatic response to an assertion by Justice Douglas in his dissenting opinion in Wisconsin v. Yoder. 26 Douglas asserted that, "[w]hile the parents, absent dissent, normally speak for the entire family, the education of child is a matter on which the child will often have decided views." 27 Thus, argued Douglas, the state should ascertain the specific desires of the children in question rather than defer to their parents' desires that they receive religiously based education. "It is," said Douglas, "the student's judgment, not his parents', that is essential .... " 28 Carter not only describes Douglas's views as "eccentric" but also, more importantly, goes on to say that if "the state should somehow undertake to learn whether our children really want to attend a religious school," then "I am quite sure that my family, and many others too, will pick up and leave the United States, for no nation that strips away the right of parents to raise their children in their religion is worthy of allegiance" (p. 192). No one can miss Carter's passion on the point, but his very invocation of the language of rights -rather, say, than the God-commanded duty to raise his children in the one true path -reveals how very much the basic language of his argument is thoroughly mainstream.
Thus, for better or worse, and regardless of whether one agrees with Carter concerning each and every particular about public policy, 29 he does not speak in a voice that is basically challenging, or even "defamiliarizing," 30 to any but the most antireligious secularist. For me, this is for the better; it surely makes his arguments accessible to a 24. Hartigan, supra note 17, at 1. 25 Although, as a parent, I can thoroughly understand the urge to mold one's children, I see no argument in principle for treating them in essence as the property of the parents to do with as they wish in regard to their education. This is, it should be emphasized, not at all an argument that the state should be able to do whatever it wishes in regard to the education of its young citizens. I will not explore this issue further in this review.
30. Defami/iarization has been defined as "the distinctive effect achieved by literary works in disrupting our habitual perception of the world, enabling us to 'see' things afresh, according to the theories of some English Romantic poets and of Russian Formalism." CHRIS BALDICK, THE CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF LITERARY TERMS 53-54 (1990).
[Vol. 92:1873 far wider audience than might otherwise be the case. Still, this only reinforces Hartigan's observation that the ironic function, albeit surely not the purpose, of Carter's book may be to reinforce the hegemony of standard models of secular academic discourse even if they are employed on behalf of religious adherents. Finally, whatever Perry's and Carter's critiques of philosophical liberalism and some practitioners of liberal politics, they are themselves relatively unabashed political liberals as that term is used within the spectrum of American politics. Carter speaks throughout his book as a friend of political liberalism 31 who is worried that the antagonism toward religious discourse on the part of some of its philosophical leaders will drive those who are religious away from liberalism and toward a far more receptive radical right. He clearly views any such prospect as potentially disastrous. It can therefore occasion no surprise that President Clinton has so eagerly embraced his book, as is the case, I suspect, with many other liberals more secular than the President but equally recognizing the political importance of the return to the Democratic Party of evangelical Christians lured away by the Republican Party over the past two decades. 32 Perhaps the party will garner some of this support simply by exhibiting a respect for religious discourse that has been lacking; it will gain yet more support, I suspect, by demonstrating a willingness to change at least some traditional political stances associated with liberalism. These include, most prominently, hostility to offering any state aid even to parents of modest means in order to allow them to exercise their constitutional right to educate their children in religious schools 33 or, within the public schools, an unwillingness to allow religious students to opt out of aspects of the curriculum deemed offensive to their religious tenets. 34
As already suggested, I substantially agree with Carter's general argument and have publicly endorsed some of the same policies that he advocates. 35 Moreover, as I have indicated elsewhere,36 I basically agree that people should be allowed to make whatever arguments using whatever epistemic discourse they find appropriate. One should be able to understand without much effort why resentment might be the response to one's being forced, by the demands of an ostensible system of "public reason,'' 37 to speak a language that is deeply alien to one's core being.
All of this being said, I find it difficult to agree with Carter's suggestion that listeners of the religious discourse of others who do not share their religious premises should nonetheless accept or, indeed, "cherish" (p. 230) that mode of speech. If someone argues to me that God requires X, whether X be social justice for the poor or the prohibition of eating pork, it simply cannot count as a reason for my doing X unless I share a view of the world that includes both the ontological reality of God's existence and the epistemological possibility of ascertaining divine desire. In the absence of the requisite ontology and epistemology, the statements predicated upon them simply can have no real meaning for me. Similarly, that Scripture declaims about creation, morality, or the occurrence of miraculous events provides no reason whatsoever for me to accept the particular account offered. That is, I gather, what it means to be secular. If one does accept Scripture -or, for that matter, anything else -as probative evidence of divine revelation, then one is not a secularist.
Carter begins his second chapter with the statement that "[o]ne good way to end a conversation ... is to tell a group of well-educated professionals that you hold a political position -preferably a controversial one, such as being against abortion or pornography -because it is required by your understanding of God's will" (p. 23). I agree with Mark Tushnet, though, that unless the other participants in the conversation "share with you a set of religious beliefs about how people go about discovering God's will and how to tell when you have discerned what God's will really is, it is actually hard to figure out where the conversation might go next." 38 Carter himself asserts that "religion is really an alien way of knowing the world" (p. 43), and it is never easy to know how to respond to someone with a sensibility that is truly "alien" to one's own. One can say, in a suitable tone either of condescension or sarcasm, "that's nice," but that surely would not help the conversation along. Otherwise, it seems that all one can do, if one is a secularist, is to say, in a tone either of regret or triumph, that she just cannot make sense of arguments predicated on "God's will."
To be sure, invocation of "God's will" does not always still further discussion, especially when that phrase is used to refer to the teachings of, say, natural law or "right reason," centuries-old, basically rationalist traditions of argumentation that can easily be carried on with minimal reference to theological predicates. These traditions use God principally as an ontological foundation for what is revealed in fact [Vol. 92:1873 through ordinary methods of rational analysis. Revelation as such plays a limited role indeed. For adherents of this position, part of God's benevolence has been to give us a rational capacity -or intuition -to achieve knowledge of moral ends. Indeed, one can predicate even less rationalist recourse to customary norms and conventional wisdom on the notion that they reflect some kind of divine desire. The dilemma of religious argument arises most strongly, not in these rationalist or quasi-rationalist debates, but, rather, when someone evokes God as ordering, through revelation, something that runs profoundly counter to what is seemingly taught by ordinary methods of reason. Consider, for example, a command to slay a beloved child. Kierkegaard well spoke of the "teleological suspension of the ethical," referring, of course, to Abraham's sacrifice of Isaac. 39 At that point one is certainly confronted with an "alien" -some would even say bizarre -sensibility that cannot easily be accepted by someone outside of its domain. 40 That someone bases her views on divine revelation, rather than, say, presumed messages received from Venusian spaceships, may lead me to wish to accommodate those views, especially if the costs are not very high in regard to other goals I have. 41 Yet it could never lead me 40. Fairness requires me to note that one might well describe as the "teleological suspension of the ethical" the willingness of persons to accept calls of sacrifice, whether of themselves, their loved ones, or, of course, strangers, issued by the state. Nothing in this review should be read as an endorsement of transferring the commitment formerly felt to a divine presence instead to the secular state.
41. At least two readers have challenged me to specify why I would grant more respectand accommodation -to the believer in religious revelation than to the hearer of commands from Venus. After all, I have announced that I do not in fact believe that religious revelation is any more "real," ontologically, than a command from Venus. I suppose the honest answer to the question is that I would classify myself as an agnostic rather than an atheist. That is, I am unpersuaded by the evidence of God's existence or participation in human history. Yet I cannot find it in me to condemn as "irrational" those who are religious. Perhaps the answer boils down to the fact that some of my best friends, whom I respect both as decent human beings and, more relevantly to the instant discussion, serious intellectuals, are deeply religious, and I am unwilling to dismiss them as being necessarily deluded. to change my mind about the substantive issue for which she offers the revelatory evidence. I might -and do -cherish, for a variety of reasons, some who exemplify a religious sensibility, but that is, I think, different from genuinely cherishing views that, from my own perspective, just do not make sense. Just as committed Christians will often describe themselves as loving the sinner while hating the sin, I can imagine cherishing the person with an alien sensibility -because, for example, that person behaves in a variety of commendable wayseven while I remain thoroughly distanced from -though I certainly do not "hate" -the sensibility itself. I suppose that, when all is said and done, this means that I do view "religiously based moral arguments as inferior to secular ones" (p. 258), at least in the specific sense that the former will prove unavailing to me as reasons for action.
Could anyone claiming to be a secularist ever not treat theologically based arguments as "inferior" -in the operational sense of capacity to persuade -even if one admired their intellectual intricacy? To be persuaded by a theological argument is, I think, just to say that one is not in fact a secularist. Secular arguments, even when offered by someone who is otherwise deeply religious, may in fact persuade the secularist and lead to changes of mind regarding important public issues. This is, of course, no small point, as illustrated by the following example.
I have written publicly of Michael McConnell's impact on my thinking about such issues as the legitimacy of state aid to parochial education and accommodation of religious sensibilities in public education. 42 Though McConnell is a devout Christian, what affected me so strongly was his appeal to a thoroughly secular argument about the meaning of equality within the context of the contemporary welfare state. Moreover, as I have already indicated, the most persuasive parts of Carter's book, at least in regard to most of his fellow legal academics, are those couched in standard rhetorical tropes devoid of theological content.
A second aspect of Carter's argument that leaves me with decidedly mixed feelings is his description of "two chief functions that religions can serve in a democracy" (p. 36). First, "they can serve as the COUNTERS WITH ALIENS (1994). In the book, he apparently indicates that he believes the accounts of his patients and suggests that our own rejection of those accounts is generated primarily by a resistance to the enormous implications they have for our most basic beliefs about the world. I remain skeptical, but it is chastening, at the least, to find a certified Harvard professor who is not. Of such developments (sometimes) are paradigm shifts made! All of this restates the problem rather than answers it. A genuine answer would, no doubt, require a book that I am almost certainly incapable of writing. sources of moral understanding without which any majoritarian system can deteriorate into simple tyranny" (p. 36). Second, "they can mediate between the citizen and the apparatus of government, providing an independent moral voice." 43 Indeed, more strongly, Carter insists that "religions are at their most useful when they serve as democratic intermediaries and preach resistance" (p. 132) -including resistance to the presumably inadequate view of life held by secularists.
As to his first function, the key word is almost certainly can. It would be tendentious to deny that particular religious tenets can serve to undergird nonoppressive notions of politics. Can, however, is a distinctly different logical operator from must. It seems equally tendentious to deny that particular religious tenets can encourage monumental indifference or, indeed, outright hostility to any notion of liberal democracy. As for the indifference, consider only the political implications of St. Paul's assertion that "there is no authority except from God, and those that exist have been instituted by God. Therefore he who resists the authorities resists what God has appointed, and those who resist will incur judgment." 44 As for active hostility, consider only the triumphalist Catholicism embraced by Ferdinand and Isabella and reflected in the Spanish Inquisition led by Torquemada and the ruthless expulsion of the Jews in 1492. It is, to put it mildly, impossible to view this as contributing to "democracy" or protecting against "simple tyranny."45
This point is necessarily interrelated with his second argument emphasizing the "power of resistance" (p. 37) on the part of religions to the overweening demands of the state. "A religion is, at its heart, a way of denying the authority of the rest of the world; it is a way of saying to fellow human beings and to the state those fellow humans have erected, 'No, I will not accede to your will'" (p. 41). It is, says Carter, important to accommodate such rebels, though "the reason for accommodation [is] not the protection of individual conscience, but the preservation of the religions as independent power bases that exist in large part in order to resist the state" (p. 134). Carter would, no doubt, agree with Columbia history professor Istvan Deak's description of Roman Catholicism as "a beautiful anachronism in our age of crazed nationalism" insofar as "virtually every devout Catholic pre-43. P. 36. Carter notes that "from Tocqueville's day to contemporary theories of pluralism, the need for independent mediating institutions has been a staple of political science." Pp. serves in his heart some remnants of his denomination's transnational loyalty and the duty of Catholics to defy immoral laws." 46 In the abstract these are powerful, perhaps even thrilling, statements. I have no desire to reinforce the ·general authority -indeed, what is sometimes little less than the idolatrous claims -of the modem state, and I often admire those who resist in the name of higher authority. 47 But, of course, the moral valence assigned to resistance may well depend on who is resisting what.
As Carter himself notes, the "radically destabilizing proposition" of resistance is "central not only to the civil resistance of Martin Luther King, Jr., and Mohandas Gandhi, but also to Operation Rescue" (p. 41), whose participants not only attempt to disrupt the lawful operations of abortion clinics but also, and more significantly, appear to be quite tolerant of those who would murder doctors who perform abortions. 48 Similarly, as someone concerned with the future of JewishPalestinian relations in Israel and the West Bank, I am less than pleased to read that a former chief rabbi of Israel, Shlomo Goren, has publicly declared that Jewish law requires that soldiers of the Israeli Defense Forces refuse to obey potential orders to uproot Jewish settlers on lands to be given -or, perhaps more accurately, returnedto their pre-1967 Palestinian possessors. 49 Members of Peace Now, a dovish group of Israeli Jews, described his call as "seditious" and "aimed at undermining the rule of law in Israel"; they urged the government "to place Rabbi Goren on trial for incitement and sedition." 50 One does not have to endorse this latter call, which evokes some of the worst episodes in the history of American civil liberties, in order to believe that Rabbi Goren and the sensibility he exemplifies are indeed 47. I write these comments on Martin Luther King's birthday, and I have no doubt that the United States would have been significantly worse off had King not challenged, from the foundation of his own deep religious commitments, the legitimacy of American racial relations.
48. After reading a draft of this review, Professor Michael Stokes Paulsen registered exception to this description of Operation Rescue. He commented that even the position described in the text must be understood against the background assumption that abortion is indeed murder and multiple abortions thus quite literally mass murder. No doubt he is right, just as I have no doubt that I would be considerably more accepting of violence directed against abortionists if I shared that view. After all, anyone who supports the bombing of Serbian positions in Bosnia, with the deaths attendant on such a policy, because of outrage at the murders of innocents now taking place in that country, can scarcely claim to be repelled by the infliction of violence on wrongdoers if no other option seems likely to stop the offensive actions. To oppose Operation Rescue, then, requires taking a substantive position on abortion, rather than simply taking refuge in arguments about the obligation always to follow the positive law of the state or, indeed, even to refrain always from committing what the state defines as murder. [Vol. 92:1873 menaces to both democracy and peace. 51 Of course, it is no part of Rabbi Goren's self-description to be "useful" to democracy or even, depending on its nature, to peace itself. Indeed, from certain religious perspectives, there is something almost insulting about Carter's functionalist defense of religion, for it suggests that religion is best tested by its usefulness to basically humanistic concerns rather than by its conformity to divine command, whatever the consequences. There can be no doubt that many religions have contributed wonderfully to the world even as defined by secularists; there can be as little doubt that many have been the source of great evil and catastrophe. Carter does not doubt this; one of his chapters is titled "Religious Fascism" (p. 263), and, as suggested earlier, he is nearly as hostile in general to the political program of the religious right as to the insensitivity of the standard-model secular liberal. Still, Carter is almost certainly correct when he cautions that the reason to denounce "religious fascism" is that it is indeed fascist rather than that it is religious. 52 That being said, one ought to be no more tolerant, accepting, or cherishing of religiously founded fascism than of its more secular variants.
II
It should be obvious that both proponents and opponents of religious involvement in public life fundamentally assume that a religious perspective can make a real difference to one's activity in the world. 51 . Indeed, since I wrote the above lines, the potential for conflict between at least some rabbis and the Israeli state has grown significantly greater in the aftermath of the Hebron massa· cre and the growing hints from the Rabin government that at least some settlers may be moved I must admit that I am now less inclined to equate a governmental crackdown on these rabbis and their allies with the shameful United States prosecution of American communists in Dennis v. United States, 341U.S. 494 (1951) . The former threaten a potential civil war within the Israeli Jewish community in a way that the communists never did in this country. Prudence may dictate restraint, but that is obviously different from resting the argument on an abstract principle of the state's duty to tolerate truly incendiary speech when delivered, not by "an unkown man," Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 628 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting), but by persons with the stature of Rabbis Goren and Shapira.
52. See, e.g., p. 266 ("If the Christian Coalition is wrong for America, it must be because its message is wrong on the issues, not because its message is religious."). Similarly, secularists are in error if they "suppose that it is the Christian Coalition's religiosity rather than its platform that is the enemy." Id. This is certainly true phenomenologically, that is, in terms of the selfunderstanding of the religious believer. Carter refers at one point to "the centrality of the word of God in the lives of believing Christians" (p. 77). He had earlier referred to "people who live faith-guided lives" as "individuals who look to their religious traditions for instruction, or at least influence, not only about how they should behave, but about moral truth" (p. 18). Moreover, one should note well President Clinton's avowal, in regard to "those of us who have faith," of its "animat [ Phenomenology, in this account, refers to "internal" understandings. s4 But there is also, of course, the question of observed behavior. Clinton's statement, for example, suggests that possession of religious faith, as what social scientists call an "independent variable," should at least correlate with -and indeed cause -what it is that the possessors "do" in political life. Empirical research certainly does find some correlations between religious identification, on the one hand, and political beliefs and propensity to vote for given political parties, ss on the other, even as it is always necessary to remember that, whatever the category, there will always be many "exceptions" who behave contrary to stereotype. Let us assume, then, that Carter and Clinton are correct in asserting that religious faith "matters"-that one indeed discovers something significant about X, in terms of predicting X's thought and subsequent behavior, by finding out that X is religious. What might follow from this assumption?
One important consequence, I believe, is .that one might legitimately be interested in the religious faith of public officials precisely because one would have reason to believe that it does indeed structure 53. Remarks, supra note 1, at *3. [Vol. 92:1873 their actions in the world, including, of course, actions with potentially grave consequences for others. If this is in fact true, it suggests that the presence or absence of religious faith is a matter of legitimate public concern and, consequently, a fit subject for questions and analysis by news reporters. Far more controversially, one might suggest that the same is true of the queries of U.S. senators faced with the task of providing advice and consent in regard to presidential nominees for high office.
Imagine, for example, that President Clinton, altogether plausibly, chooses to manifest his esteem for Professor Carter by naming him to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals or, indeed, the Supreme Court of the United States, for which he is amply qualified in terms of any traditional professional criteria. Were I a senator sitting in judgment on the nomination, I might well be less interested in discussions of Carter's analyses of separation of powers, 56 constitutional interpretation, 57 or affirmative action 5 s than in the extent to which his own religious faith could lead him, as a sitting judge, to resist the commands of otherwise valid positive law. Would Carter, in contrast, devote himself to "prayerful consideration" aimed toward "discerning and then enacting the will of God" (p. 77) rather than to more secular consideration of what the U.S. Constitution means, as interpreted without reference to religiously inspired modalities? Could Carter legitimately rebuff any such questions as to the relevance of his religious faith by reference to Article VI of the Constitution, with its prohibition of religious tests for public office, 60 or by reference to the First Amendment's Free Exercise and Establish-ment Clauses? 61 I see no good reason why the answer should .be yes, at least if one accepts his -and Clinton's -own proposition that religion, when not a "hobby," in fact structures one's entire stance toward the world.
Ironically, Carter is one of our leading scholars of the confirmation process, which he has described, indeed, as a "mess." 62 One can have little doubt that interrogation of nominees as to their religious tenets would make confirmation even messier than it is now, and that problem may be a good reason to veer away from the course described above. But it should at least be clear that any such decision is, like that involving exclusion of certain dispositive evidence from criminal trials, based on second-order policy considerations rather than an argument that religious views are irrelevant in assessing a nominee's fitness for office. That argument simply cannot be made by anyone who accepts the main thrust of Carter's thesis.
III
Carter made a deliberate decision, I think it fair to say, to aim his book at a general audience rather than at his fellow academics. As a result, he often paints his arguments with broad brushes; legal doctrines are alluded to rather than carefully analyzed, and contextual nuance is sometimes absent. A discussion of the implications of the welfare state for the flourishing of religion in America (pp. 136-55) is little more than an introduction to a topic that could merit a full book in itself. Carter offers two chapters on the complexities attached to religion in the public schools (pp. 156-210), but he examines only the issue of the teaching of "creation science" in any depth. 63 In the course of this discussion, Carter indicates that he would give parents "broad rights to exempt their children from education programs to which they raise religious objections" (p. 174). "Only in this way," he says, can society pay genuine homage to "the epistemological diversity that leads some parents to prefer to learn science from the Bible" (p. 174). It is crucial to emphasize that such "exemption" does not simply mean the right to avoid public schools entirely, but, rather, it means the right to refuse to participate in certain aspects of the regular 66 It offers a superb and comprehensive overview of Mozert that no one interested in the topics raised by Carter should ignore. Bates offers genuine contributions to understanding both the specifics of Mozert and the broader issues oftheKulturkampftaking place within the surrounding culture.
The subtitle of Battleground is at once unfortunate and illuminating. It is unfortunate in that it might suggest to the casual reader a somewhat sensationalist account, especially given its publication by a subdivision of Simon and Schuster, a leading mass-market publisher with a demonstrated proclivity toward sensationalism. 67 One suspects that most readers would predict from the subtitle -and, perhaps, from the author's status as a Harvard-trained lawyer -a fairly unsympathetic portrayal of the "religious right" and its "struggle for control of our classrooms." Those expectations, however understandable, are mistaken, for Bates has written a remarkably fair-mindedat least from my perspective -account of a complex human drama. Indeed, the real illumination of the subtitle comes from its emphasis on "one mother's crusade," for the book focuses heavily on Vicki Frost, the guiding spirit, though not the named plaintiff, of the Mozert case.
Frost objected strenuously to the assignment by the Hawkins County schools, which her children attended, of materials from a series of readers developed by Holt, Rinehart, and Winston that she said called into question tenets of her fundamentalist Christian faith. For example, one story involved mental telepathy, which Frost rejected as contrary to her faith. Other stories suggested that certain ways of life condemned by Frost's own theological understanding, such as "women's liberation," were in fact tolerable and worthy of respect. Yet others seemingly taught that Christianity was not a uniquely privileged road to God. 68 It is essential to realize what Frost and her colleagues did, and did not, claim. Although at one point they appeared to demand the excision of offensive books from the public school curriculum as such, they in fact dropped any such demands and in,stead insisted only that their children be allowed to read other, nonoffensive material and be exempted from any class discussions involving the offensive works {pp. 37-38). As Bates makes clear, the schools initially accommodated them. The children retreated to the school library while their classmates discussed the regularly assigned reading {p. 71).
What made all the difference was a policy decision by the Hawkins County School Board itself that any such accommodation was unacceptable {p. 85). In effect, the Board made it a condition of attending public schools that students accept, without exception, the precise curriculum established by the public school system. One might view this as the offer of a classic adhesion contract: the potential consumer of public school services must take it -that is, attend the public schools on the terms offered -or leave it -exercise one's option, protected by Tennessee law, 69 to opt out of the public schools entirely and attend a private school or, indeed, receive home schooling.
To put it mildly, Hawkins County never demonstrated what besides administrative convenience justified such a limited set of options. Nor, I think, could it have made such a successful demonstration. The reason is simple. As noted by Judge Lively, writing for the majority in the Sixth Circuit, "[t]he state board of education and local boards of education are prohibited from regulating the selection of faculty or textbooks or the establishment of a curriculum in churchrelated schools." 70 It seems, therefore, impossible for the State to argue that it has any very high interest in any given facet of its public school curriculum if it in fact allows the opt-out by those who choose nonpublic schooling. In any event, though, the Sixth Circuit proved unsympathetic to any such arguments and upheld the power of the Board, 71 and the Supreme Court denied certiorari without any re- corded dissent. 72 Bates makes two essential contributions in Battleground. First, he conveys, with a minimum of editorial comment, the personalities and views of the major participants in the struggle. He is not interested in creating melodramatic heroes or villains. Second, Bates demonstrates that one of the factors that almost undoubtedly led to the polarization between the parents and the school board was the participation of national organizations driven by their own goals and representing profoundly different sectors of the American class and social structure.
On the part of the parents, the chief organization was Concerned Women for America (CWA), led by Tim and Beverly LaHaye. They provided the parents with their chief lawyer, Michael P. Farris, a Gonzaga Law School graduate who was a "Baptist who believed the Bible is literally true, a recently ordained minister, and a father who taught his children at home in order to safeguard them from the corruptions of the public schools." 73 "[T]wo other CWA lawyers and a law student" joined Farris at trial (p. 234). The school board was befriended by People for the American Way (PAW), which led ultimately to its representation by Timothy Dyk, a Harvard Law School alumnus and partner at Wilmer, Cutler, and Pickering, a major Washington law firm. Indeed, working with Dyk were four other lawyers from Wilmer, Cutler, and Pickering, along with three local lawyers and a lawyer representing the State of Tennessee, which had intervened (p. 234).
Bates quotes a member of the team defending the school board as saying that the case "was very much Concerned Women for America versus People for the American Way. The local school board officials and the local plaintiffs, while not pawns, were somehow less important" (p. 235). Bates argues that, " [d] espite their mirror-image political convictions, People for the American Way and Concerned Women for America had much in common in the early 1980s" (pp. 149-50), beginning with the fact, as revealed in the very titles of their respective organizations, that each "claimed to represent the truest traditions of the United States" (p. 150). Concomitantly, "[e]ach saw the other as part of a wealthy, well-disciplined cabal aiming to quash dissent: to outlaw Christianity, to outlaw pluralism; to force antireligious views on everyone, to force religious views on everyone" (p. 150). For Beverly LaHaye, whom Bates describes as challenging Phyllis Schlafiy for the status of "the religious right's leading woman" (p. 105), secular humanism is a "pernicious philosophy," and leagues Judge Lively and Judge Kennedy -he still adopted a posture of extreme judicial re· straint that left the plaintiffs, as a practical matter, helpless. "[f]eminism and the sexual revolution are tentacles of the octopus Humanism which is seeking to destroy Christianity and Christian principles in American life" (p. 103). For PAW, groups like CWA and parents like the Frosts and Mozerts were reducible to opponents of "diversity, discussion and just plain thinking,'' who were, in addition, racist and antisemitic (pp. 150-51). For the PAW attorneys, in particular, there was another brooding omnipresence over the suit: Jerry Falwell, then president of the Moral Majority, at that time the most prominent organization of militantly right-wing evangelical Christians. Bates quotes a member of the team defending the school board as saying that "the enemy was really not Frost or Mozert, but Falwell, lurking in the background" (p. 235).
As Anthony Podesta, the president of PAW, put it, "This one was made to order. Vicki Frost, Michael Farris, Beverly LaHaye, the Gablers -scriptwriters in Hollywood could not have invented a better cast of characters. It just seemed too delicious to believe." 74 Delicious or not, the suit clearly took on a life of its own that left the actual adversaries, neighbors in Hawkins County, far behind, and Bates tells the courtroom story well. Law students could do far worse than study his tale as an example, for better and distinctly for worse as well, of contemporary American "public interest" litigation in which each side is represented by ideologically zealous organizations who view the actual clients as little more than pawns in larger struggles over control of American culture -and, it must be said, as useful symbols in the endless solicitation of financial contributions from ordinary citizens who share one or the other set of fears and willingness to demonize the opposition.
CONCLUSION
From the very beginning of our national history, the United States has been blessed -or burdened -by an almost astonishing array of religious sects and, concomitantly, by the necessity to decide what measure of toleration or accommodation is due those who deviate from the dominant culture in belief or, more ominously, in practice. Our national motto -e pluribus unum -has always carried with it an implicit question mark as to our ability to weave some kind of social unity out of the diversity found in our social fabric. Multiculturalism is simply the most recent rhetorical label for this' aspect of American reality, with attendant concern about the "fraying" 75 modating even "alien" sensibilities and practices. For better or worse, there is no reason to believe that American culture will become more homogeneous or that fewer cases in the future will test the meaning of multiculturalism when culture involves religious dimensions. Each of these two books offers its own contribution to understanding why the issue perseveres and why it is so unlikely, as well, that any genuine consensus will bridge the chasm that now separates the various contenders.
